THE ELEMENT OF MENS REA IN RECKLESSNESS
AND "CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE"
EDWARD W. HAUTAMAKI*
A fundamental principle of Anglo-American criminal law
is that for conduct to be punishable criminally, there must
be a concurrence of criminal intent, the mens rea, and of a
forbidden act, resulting in a proscribed harm. Based on the
premise that criminal sanctions should not be imposed on
those who act involuntarily, or without the required criminal
intent, the converse of this rule is that criminal sanctions
should fall only on those who knowingly violate those rights
of others which the state protects. The desirability of requiring mens rea represents an ideal, as shown by the fact
that the element of criminal intent has been abrogated in
the strict liability offenses.
One accepting the desirability of continuing mens rea as
an element of criminal offenses is hard put to find a rational
basis for the concept that homicide resulting from negligent
conduct alone suffices for criminal liability, and thus for the
concept of involuntary manslaughter. The difficulty stems
from a clash between the desire to continue the requirement
of criminal intent, with the definitional inconsistencies flowing in the wake of the terms "negligence" and "involuntary,"
which imply an absence of intent or of even a mental awareness that a risk has been incurred.
Harms caused intentionally and negligently are directly
at odds with each other. At one extereme lies intentional
harm, properly and traditionally the subject of criminal
sanctions. Here the actor adverts to the possibility of harm,
and then acts or fails to act either with the express purpose
of achieving.the harm, or with knowledge that the proscribed
harm must inevitably follow his act or omission, however
much he may not desire the consequences. At the other
extreme lies the negligent conduct sufficient to support civil
liability. Here there is an entire absence of intent. The
actor neither desires the consequences nor deems them in* 3rd year law student Duke University; A.B. Duke, 1950.
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evitable, if he adverts to them at all. In the language of tort
law he creates an unreasonable risk of harm to another. On
the basis of an objective standard by which his conduct is
later tested, he has failed to act as a reasonably prudent man
under the circumstances would have acted. Such harms are
to be vindicated in civil courts.
Between these extremes of conduct lies an ill-defined midground, reckless conduct. In brief, reckless conduct is compounded of the elements of the actor's having (1) actual
knowledge that a course of conduct he is about to embark
upon involves a high degree of risk of causing death or
substantial harm to another, and (2) a conscious decision
to risk occurrence of the harm. Where these strict requirements are met, the reckless conduct is properly the subject
of criminal punishment. While the actor cannot be said to
have intended the harm (indeed, he does not wish the harm
to occur; he is only indifferent or reckless as to whether it
occurs), he has intended at least to risk occurrence of the
harm. Where actual knowledge of the extent of danger is
required, the conduct lies closer to the pole of intentional
harm, but where a court decides it suffices that a reasonable
man would have known the danger, the conduct approaches
the opposite extreme of negligence.
Two Kentucky cases which point out neatly the essential
distinctions between negligence and recklessness are Com2
1
monwealth v. Tackett and Largent v. Commonwealth.
In the Tackett case, the defendant was indicted for voluntary manslaughter. The evidence tended to show he had
purchased a truck the day before, and had no knowledge of
any defects therein. While rounding a curve at about 35
to 40 m. p. h., he applied his brakes to avoid hitting some
children who had run into his path. In so doing, the wheels
of the truck locked, causing the truck to run into a group
of persons standing at the roadside, killing two. The court,
on appeal, affirmed the defendant's acquittal. Whatever
the possibility of his civil liability, he was not criminally
liable.
1

299 Ky. 731, 187 S.W.2d 297 (1945).
265 Ky. 598, 97 S.W.2d 538 (1936).
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With this case, compare the Largent case. There the defendant had known for some time that his car had a defective steering gear. While intoxicated he drove the car at a
speed of 50 to 60 m.p.h. In driving, he had at one point
deliberately forced another driver off the road by pretending
he meant to run into him, and.when he succeeded in forcing
him off the road, merely looked back and laughed. He persisted in this conduct, and while attempting to pass a car at
the crest of a hill, caused a collision which killed another.
The defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter,
despite his contentions the death was "accidental."
In affirming the conviction, the appellate court said,
apropos of recklessness:
"Yet appellant, despite his knowledge . . . . continued to daringly drive his car in reckless disregard of the safety of other users of the road. Such
conduct in itself clearly . . . conduced to establish
the charged offense of reckless driving, when it was
thus so wantonly done with full realization of the
danger to which it exposed other users of the highway." (emphasis added)
It is apparent here the defendant did not cause the harm
inadvertently, as was true in the Tackett case. Having
chosen to run the risk of causing death or substantial harm
to another and having lost, the defendant is criminally liable.
It is equally clear that to punish the defendant in the Tackett
case would be to fly in the very teeth of the fundamental
principle that it is only voluntary conduct which should be
punished criminally.
In the fields of "criminal negligence" and "involuntary
manslaughter," the main problem is a terminological one,
The problem stems from the failure of courts adequately and
logically to rationalize the desirability of continuing mens
rea as a fundamental of criminal law in terms which do not
carry the non-criminal connotations of the words "negligence" and "involuntary." The cases make it clear that
while the courts generally require more than that type of
negligence sufficient to support civil liability, they fail expressly to state that criminal liability ought to attach only
to voluntary conduct, i.e., reckless conduct, where reckless-
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ness is defined to include actual knowledge of the danger of
harm risked by the defendant.
Hall, in his Principles of Criminal Law,s has accurately
stated the problem as follows:
"What rises to prominence in the case-law is not
any serious doubt regarding the relevant doctrine,
but the inability of the judges to express the difference between recklessness and negligence clearly
and their slowness in adopting apt terms even after
the essential differences had been articulated. For
many years they relied on adjectives qualifying
negligence to carry their meaning; they continued
to do this long after the adjectives were regarded
as mere 'vituperative epithets'."
Variations exist among the courts as to what type of
conduct suffices to warrant criminal sanctions. Some courts,
usually aided by statute, hold that ordinary negligence suffices; we are not here concerned with such statutes, which
either expressly or by judicial construction show a legislative intent to abrogate the need for mens rea.4 The bulk of
the courts, despite difficulties raised by talking "negligence"
HALL, PRitcWLEs OF CRIMINAL LAw, 227 (1947). For judicial expo.
sitions of the confusion caused by talking In degrees of negligence, see
Andrews v. Directorof.Public Prosecutions,26 Cr. App. R. 34 (House of
Lords, 1937), where the court, quoting from an earlier case, says:
".. . to determine whether the negligence . . . amounted or did not
amount to a crime, judges have used many epithets such as 'culpable,'
'criminal,' 'gross,' 'wicked,' 'clear,' 'complete'." Here the court, while It
sees the problem, fails to provide any better concept, though conceding
that "reckless most" nearly meets the terminological problem. After
finding the ideas of mens rea and crime and punishment did not clarify
the problem, the court went on to say, that for negligence to be criminal,
it must be shown ". . . the negligence of the accused went beyond a
mere matter of compensation between the subjects and showed such
disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime
against the State and conduct deserving punishment." Obviously the
vice of such a vague test is that it makes for unevenness in the application of criminal laws instead of providing for a fairly definite standard. But of. State v. Bates, 65 S.D. 105, 271 N.W. 765 (1937), where
the court stated the same terminological confusion and found mere
epithets useless, but apparently found the concept of mens rea more
useful. The South Dakota court required "Intentional" conduct such
as would show the defendant "consciously realized that his conduct
would in all probability (as distinguished from possibility) produce the
precise result which it did produce."
For judicial interpretations of these statutes, concluding that under
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and the proper degree needed for criminal liability, make
it clear that ordinary negligence is not enough, and that
what is needed for criminal liability is recklessness.
The rule that ordinary negligence is not enough for criminal liability has been ably stated in People v. Wells,5 where
the court said:
".

the defendant can be held criminally respon-

sible only if his acts under the circumstances constituted a reckless disregard of the consequences of
his act, and an indifference as to the rights of
others. 'Mere lack of foresight, stupidity, irresponsibility, thoughtlessness, ordinary carelessness, however serious the consequences may happen
to be, do not constitute culpable negligence. There
must exist in the mind of the accused, at the time
of the act or omission, a consciousness of the probable consequences of the act, and a wanton disregard of them." People v. Carlson, 187 Misc. 230, 26
N.Y. S.2d 1003 (1941)."
Under this approach, which either expressly refers to
recklessness, or inarticulately gropes toward a standard of
recklessness though phrased in varying degrees or types of
negligence, it has been held one could not be convicted of
manslaughter for starting a fire by smoking in bed and then
failing in his confusion upon discovering it to give the alarm
to others in the house ;" where he carelessly shot another
hunter believing him to be a deer ;7 where he caused the
death of another when the wheels of his truck locked ;s or
them ordinary negligence suffices for a criminal conviction, see State
v. Hedges, 8 Wash.2d 652, 113 P.2d 530 (1941); State v. Ramser, 17
Wash.2d 581, 136 P.2d 1013 (1943); People v. Carmen, 36 Cal.2d 768,
228 P.2d 281 (1951); Wilson v. State, 70 Okla.Cr. 262, 105 P.2d 789
(1940). For judicial doubts as to the wisdom of such legislation, see
the Hedges case, which leaves the problem to legislative solution. Note
also the highly moralistic tone of the opinion in the Wilson case; the
validity of this case is doubtful in the light of Deberry v. State, Okla.Cr. _,
219 P.2d 253 (1950), which requires a higher degree of
negligence than does the Wilson case.
5 186 Misc. 979, 66 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1946).
People v. Hoffman, 162 Misc. 677, 294 N.Y.S. 444 (1937).
People v. Joyce, 192 Misc. 107, 84 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1948). "The killing
must be the result of culpable negligence."
' Commonwealth v. Tackett, supra, note 1.
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where his failure to check an airplane caused the death of a
passenger, when a check would have revealed structural defects in the plane.9 Similarly, more than the ordinary negligence needed for tort law has been held necessary to support a conviction of manslaughter where the defendant failed to use due care to see that a hawser cleared the deceased's
fishing boat, causing the deceased's drowning by knocking
him into the water ;1o where he accidentally killed a passenger by driving into a ditch to avoid a collision with an oncoming vehicle;" or where the defendant killed a pedestrian
by failing to observe the full width of a pedestrian cross12

walk.

Where the test is phrased in terms of a high degree of
negligence, it has been held reversible error to fail to charge
a jury as to the higher degree of "negligence" needed for
criminal sanctions, as compared to the lower degree sufficient for tort liability.

13

While it has been held that moral reprehensibility alone is
not sufficient to justify a conviction for manslaughterter,"'
9 French v. State, 235 Ala. 570, 180 So. 592 (1932). "Criminal negligence may not be predicated upon mere negligence or carelessness, but
only upon that degree of negligence or carelessness which Is denominated 'gross' ".
10 State v. Arnold, 3 Terry 47, 27 A.2d 81 (Del. 0. & T. 1942). It must
be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's "omission or
negligence amounted to a reckless disregard for the safety" of others.
Conviction of
u State v. Bast, 116 Mont. 329, 151 P.2d 1009 (1944).
manslaughter reversed for failure to show the required criminal Intent.
The record did not show any evidence of the "evil design, intention, or
culpable negligence" necessary to sustain a conviction.
1" State v. Powell, 114 Mont. 571, 138 P.2d 949 (1943). "The negligence
must be aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless."
13 State v. Wright, 128 Me. 404, 148 A. 141 (1929); Shows v. State, 175
Miss. 604, 168 So. 862 (1936). Trial court charged in the Shows case
that ". . . culpable negligence is the want of that usual and ordinary
care and caution in the performance of an act, usually and ordinarily
exercised by a reasonable and prudent person under similar circumstances and conditions." Said the court in reversing a conviction had
under this instruction: "Criminality cannot, be predicated upon mere
negligence or carelessness . . . the instructions given for the state
made a conviction on simple negligence, and were improper in a criminal prosecution."
1 People v. Pace, 220 App.Div. 495, 221 N.Y.S. 778 (1927). Reversible
error to charge "culpable negligence" must be "culpable, or blameworthy, or criminal," as under such a charge "the jury might well
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courts are quick to affirm convictions based on either some
epithetic type of negligence or recklessness, where the facts
justify an inference of such conduct. Thus, manslaughter

convictions have been upheld where the defendant, knowing
the deceased was a diabetic, advised him to forego the use

of insulin in favor of a carbohydrate-rich diet and sought to
defend his action on the grounds that "insulin is not human
-it is not fit for a dog" ;15 where he carelessly drove in the
wrong lane of traffic;16 or attempted to pass a car ahead

at a very high rate of speed and ran into another car which
had pulled almost completely off the highway to avoid the
impending collision."

Standard By Which the Recklessness Is Measured
While it is clear more than ordinary negligence is needed
for criminal liability, the courts disagree as to the proper

test of recklessness. Some follow the rule properly applicable to criminal law, as it emphasizes voluntary conduct, i.e.,
the defendant must be consciously aware of the fact that he
is creating a situation likely to result in death or substantial
harm to another, and he must then risk occurrence of the
have obtained the impression that negligence to the extent of blameworthiness only, failure to use ordinary care (as well as reckless indifference) met the test as to criminal culpability."
'1 State v. Karunsky, 197 Wash. 87, 84 P.2d 390 (1938).
For a similar
case holding a chiropractor criminally liable where he advised a diabetic to forego the use of insulin, knowing the patient to be diab3tic,
see State v. Heines, 144 Fla. 272, 197 So. 787 (1940).
11Zirlle v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 862, 55 S.E.2d 24 (1949) (reversed
on other grounds).
17Collins v. State, 66 Ga. App. 325, 18 S.E.2d 24 (1941). While the
conduct in this case suggests recklessness, and while the court specifies
that more than ordinary negligence is needed for criminal liability, the
court continues in a vein disturbingly reminiscent of the misdemeanor
manslaughter rule: "But the mere fact that an accident happened
through an honest apprehension of the surrounding circumstances, or
by reason of a mistake in judgment, will not excuse the person whose
act caused it, where such misapprehension or omission resulted from
negligence in failing to observe and obey any rule or precaution which
it is his duty to observe." For another suggestion that a killing occurring while the defendant is in breach of a statute may be judged by a
laxer standard, see State v. MAiller, 220 N.C. 660, 18 S.E.2d 143 (1942).
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harm.1s Others take the position that while a highly dangerous situation must be created, the defendant need not be
aware of the extent or gravity of the danger. These courts
hold it is sufficient that a reasonable man in the defendant's

shoes would have realized the danger in light of the circumstances. 19 This latter position is substantially the position

of the Restatement of Torts, which,
it goes without saying,
20
should apply only to civil liability.

Is ". . . The act must be done with the consciousness that injury will
probably result, in order to constitute wanton negligence, and such
knowledge cannot be implied." Barnett v. State, 27 Ala. App. 277, 171
So. 293, rehearing denied, 171 So. 296 (1936), aff' 184 So. 702 (1938).
"To constitute this offense . . . there must be apparent danger of causing the death of the person killed." Johnson v. State, .
Tex. . , 238
S.W.2d 766 (1951). Note that the "apparent danger" test, a statutory
requirement, is nullified by application of a reasonable man test.
".... The act was thus wantonly done with full realization of the danger
to which it exposed" others. Largent v. Commonwealth, supra, note 1.
The record discloses no evidence of "the evil design, Intention, or culpuable negligence" required for a conviction of manslaughter. State
v. Bast, supra, note 10, "There must be some action from which the jury
might reasonably infer mens rea . . . [T]he jury must find . . . the
defendant intentionally did something . . . or intentionally failed to do
something which he should have done under the circumstances that it
can be said he consciously realized that his conduct would In all probability (as distinguished from possibility)" produce the harm. State
v. Bates, supra, note 2. ". . . the fundamental . . . is knowledge, actual
or implied, that the act of the slayer tended to endanger life." Commonwealth v. Aurick, 342 Pa. 282, 19 A.2d 920 (1941). If "Implied" here
means actual knowledge is to be inferred from the evidence, then actual
knowledge is an element of the crime; however, if It means knowledge
imputed on the basis of a reasonable man test, none is needed. See
note 23, infra. "There must exist in the mind of the accused, at the
time of the act or omission, a consciousness of the probable consequences
of the act, and a wanton disregard of them." People v. Carlson, 176
Misc. 230, 26 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1941).
0 "Knowing facts that would cause a reasonable man to know danger
is equivalent to knowing the danger." Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316
Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944); Commonwealth v. Bouvier, 316 Mass.
489, 55 N.E.2d 913 (1944).
". . . the accused must have known, or
should have known, that his manner of driving the vehicle created an
unreasonable risk of harm." State v. Bolsinger, 221 Minn. 154, 21
N.W.2d 480 (1946). In the Bolsinger case, though a death had resulted,
prosecution was under the Minnesota reckless driving statute, and not
under the homicide statutes.
o For purposes of civil liability, it suffices that a reasonable man in
the defendant's shoes would have realized the danger Inherent In his
conduct, even if in fact the defendant did not realize the danger. Thus,
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A third group of states, while not expressly requiring

actual knowledge, leaves it unclear whether actual knowledge is needed. Where recklessness is defined in some phrase

such as a "callous disregard of human life," 21 or a "thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless indifference"

to the rights of others, 22 it is arguable the negative implication of words such as "callous," "heedless," or "thought-

less" is that the defendant must first have knowledge of the
rights of others to be free from the infliction of death or

bodily harm before he can be callously, heedlessly, or
thoughtlessly indifferent to them. But where the test is
framed in some specified degree of "departure from what

would be the conduct of an ordinary careful and prudent
man under the circumstances," as to furnish evidence of

"indifference to consequences" or "as to be incompatible with
a proper regard for human life,"''

it is difficult to decide

whether actual knowledge is needed. If emphasis be placed
on the reasonable man part of this departure test, then any

specified degree of departure from the conduct of a reasonable man (unless the departure is so great as to amount to

intentional conduct) must be measured against a reasonable
man standard, and hence, would require no actual knowledge,

since the reasonable man test for purposes of tort liability
requires no actual knowledge of the danger created. Per-

haps the clue to these cases is to be found in the suggestion
that the departure must be such as to import or furnish
in the RESTATEIENT, ToaTs, § 500, comment-c, (1938), Appreciation of
Extent and Gravity of Risk, it is pointed out that the defendant's failure
to apprehend danger may be "due to his own reckless temperament or
to the abnormally favorable results of previous conduct of the same
sort. It is enough that he knows or has reason to know of circumstances which would bring home to the realization of the ordinary,
reasonable man the highly dangerous character of his conduct." It
should be noted in this connection, however, that If we accept the premise that it is only voluntary conduct which should be criminally punished-and the premise is a highly desirable one--then obviously the
RESTATEIENT position has validity in criminal law only in so far as it
requires actual knowledge on the part of the actor as to the gravity
of the risk created.
M Zirkle v. Commonwealth, supra, note 15.
-2 State v. Miller, supra, note 16.
s French v. State, supra, note 8; Shows v. State, supra, note 12.
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evidence of recklessness, raising the questions of proof to
be discussed later.
There is no serious judicial doubt about the liability of
a defendant where his conduct meets the strict test of recklessness, i.e., where he knows the danger and risks its occurrence. But accepting the premise that mens rea is a desirable element to continue in criminal law inasmuch as it emphasizes the voluntary aspects of conduct, cases applying
a reasonable man test in determining criminal liability are
wrong on principle. They err in making criminal liability
turn on an objective test of intent, whereas traditionally a
subjective test is to be applied in criminal law.
In analyzing the cases, it is important to bear in mind the'
distinction between a state of mind and how that state of
mind is proved. Where mens rea is required, the state of
mind of the accused at the time of his act is determined by
a subjective test of liability, one taking into consideration
the individual traits of the defendant. On the other hand,
the mental test applied in tort cases of negligence is an objective test of liability-the reasonable man test. This test
ignores any individual mental traits or defects of the defendant and it makes no difference a defendant was in fact
unaware of the unreasonable risk of harm he created; it suffices that a reasonable man under the circumstances, who
represents the community ideal of behavior, would have
realized the risk created.
Since in both civil and criminal cases it is rare that we
can know the state of a man's mind, absent an open admission of guilt or testimony to that effect as part of the res
gestae, proof of the state of mind must necessarily be by
objective means. Here it is crucial to note that "objective"
takes on a meaning different from that which it has in the
phrase "objective test of liability." In this context, objective means proof by facts and data which are external in the
sense they are physically observable to the trier of fact. It
is on the basis of the externally observable aspects of the
defendant's conduct that his state of mind must be determined. Only in this sense of external proof can the test of
liability in recklessness in criminal cases be called "object-
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ive." Hence, it is improper to say that because of the practical necessity of proving a subjective state of mind by objective means, the standard in criminal law is an objective
one.

24

Judicial confusion as to this distinction is seen in Commonwealth v. Welansky, 25 where the defendant, owner of a
nightclub, was convicted for manslaughter for his failure to
observe that due care was used in providing proper egress
from the club in case of fire. The evidence showed somebody had been remarkably careless in attending to this matter. False doors obscured exits; some exits were locked
and others equipped with defective anti-panic hardware.
The stairs leading from a basement cocktail lounge were
very narrow in light of the many patrons. In the ensuing
Cocoanut Grove fire, scores were burned to death. In affirming a conviction of involuntary manslaughter, the court said,
as to recklessness:
"The standard of.wanton or reckless conduct.is at
once subjective and objective . . . Knowing facts
that would cause a reasonable man to know danger
is equivalent to knowing danger . . . The judge
charged the jury properly when he said, 'to constitute wanton or reckless conduct, as distinguished
from mere negligence, grave danger to others must
have been apparent and the defendant must have
chosen to run the risk rather than alter his conduct
so as to avoid the act or omission which caused the
harm.' If the grave danger was in fact realized by
the defendant, his subsequent voluntary act or omission which caused the harm amounts to wanton or
reckless conduct, no matter whether the ordinary
2' The failure of courts to observe this distinction between the subjective test as to the state of mind and the objective means whereby it
is proved is undoubtedly the reason why the Texas courts have nullified
the requirement of actual knowledge in the Texas manslaughter statute,
which requires there be "apparent danger" on the part of the defendant.
This statutory requirement has been done away with by judicial interpretation in Vasquez v. State, 121 Tex.Cr.R. 478, 52 S.W.2d 1056 (1932),
where it was held the trial court committed no error in refusing to
charge that "apparent danger" required conscious awareness of danger.
And in Johnson v. State, supra, note 17, the court stated that whether
apparent danger in fact existed "is not to be determined from the viewpoint of the accused alone, but rather from the facts as a whole."
316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944).
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man would have realized the gravity of the danger
or not . . . But even if a particular defendant is"
so stupid or so heedless that in fact he did not
realize the grave danger he cannot escape the imputation of wanton or reckless conduct in his dangerous act or omission, if an ordinary man under
the same circumstances would have realized the
gravity of danger. A man may be reckless within
the meaning of the law although he himself thought
he was careful."
Note that the appellate court's approval of the latter portion of the trial court's charge, which in effect makes ordinary negligence enough for criminal liability, is in conflict
with a later portion of the opinion which denies there is any
such thing as "criminal negligence" at Massachusetts common law. Further, the conviction in the Welansky case was
under a statute apparently meant for voluntary harms, inasmuch as the court made a point of approving the statutory
form of indictment even though used here for involuntary
manslaughter.
"Notwithstanding language used commonly in
earlier cases, and occasionally in later cases, it is
now clear . . .that at common law conduct does
not become criminal until it passes the borders of
negligence and gross negligence and enters into the
domain of wanton or reckless conduct. There is in
Massachusetts at common law no such things as
criminal negligence."
To state, as does the court, that the test of wanton or
reckless conduct is at once subjective and objective is to
state a test which means nothing. The court has confused
the subjective state of mind with the objective means whereby it is proved. Properly phrased, the charge to the jury
ought to make it clear tlat whether the defendant had actual
knowledge is to be determined from his viewpoint, by a subjective test. But proof of that state of mind must be by
means which is objective only in the sense the jury must
draw inferences from the evidence presented.
Undoubtedly the Welansky case when judged in light of
the ensuing holocaust, makes it tempting to relax the strictness of criminal law so as to permit prosecution of those
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responsible. 26 But such a relaxation also makes possible a
conviction on the basis of an objective test of liability. The
better rule is to require actual knowledge of the extent and

gravity of danger at the time the defendant risked its occurrence, thus preserving to the defendant an additional safe-

guard against the possibility of a capricious verdict by
jurors who, in a fit of moral indignation, might find him

guilty when in fact he had no criminal intent.
Where the facts of a case are so strong that it would seem
impossible the defendant did not have actual knowledge of

the harm, the jury could readily, infer such knowledge.
Obviously the jury's duty is a difficult one, but one no more
difficult than many other conclusions juries are asked to
reach. It is equally obvious the rule is not a perfect one, for
unquestionably there will be times when actual knowledge
is inferred from circumstantial evidence when as a matter
of fact (if we could somehow plumb the depths of the defendant's mind) there was no actual knowledge. This is

because inevitably a juror in deciding the unfathomable
state of another's mind must adjudge that fact in terms of his

own experience; thus bringing in the possibility of error in
human judgment.

But given the limits on human infalli-

For a suggestion that particularly outrageous conduct may have
caused a relaxation of the strictness of criminal law and a corresponding
growth in the law of criminal negligence, see HALL, PRInCnILEs OF CRaMnvAL LAW, 225-6 (1947). ". . . one cannot be certain that occasionally,
where the negligent behavior clearly violated all standards of decent
performance, the grievous consequences did not cause the penal bounds
to be extended." An analysis of the cases does not permit, however, any
clear cut assertion that the requirement for mens rea is correspondingly
relaxed as the defendant's conduct increases in moral reprehensibility.
The most that can be said on this point is that the more reprehensible
the defendant's conduct, in terms of carelessness, the -more readily
juries can Infer he acted with actual knowledge of the danger.
The ethical difficulty posed by requiring actual knowledge of danger
is that, carried to its logical limits, it permits those totally insensitive
to the rights of others to escape liability, and penalizes those who are
aware of others rights, but momentarily- forget to heed them. This
problem in turn raises questions as to the proper function of criminal
law in our society, whether criminal sanctions deter future criminal
conduct by sharpening the conscience, and many others. But even conceding validity to the ethical difficulty posed, the-fact one may be insensitive to the rights of others is no reason in law why he should not
have to pay in civil damages for the"consequences of his gross conddict.
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bility, the most we can hope for is an approximation of
ideals.
Adoption of a test of recklessness requiring actual knowledge of the danger risked would limit criminal liability to
voluntary harm. It would necessarily do away with the concept of involuntary, manslaughter, and would limit involuntary manslaughter to instances where the legislature has
provided for such a crime or where judicial construction of
a manslaughter statute is construed so as to permit conviction on the basis of a reasonable man test.
Perhaps the solution to the problem of proof lies in providing for reasonable presumptions which cast upon the
defendant, after proof of certain facts, the burden of coming
forward to disprove actual knowledge. But whatever the
solution, it does not lie in any such statement as "a man may
be reckless within the meaning of the law although he himself thought he was careful." Such a brilliant aphorism
flows smoothly from the tongue, but at the same time makes
possible the conviction of the stupid, the dull, the heedless,
and the momentarily careless. Where a man's liberty is at
stake and where, even more, he must suffer the stigma of a
criminal record, the better approach is to limit criminal
liability to voluntary harms, leaving involuntary conduct to
be vindicated in the civil courts.
Conclusions
(1) The main problem in the law of "criminal negligence"
is a terminological one, which involves reconciling the continuance of mens rea as a fundamental of criminal law with
the non-criminal connotations of "negligence." These connotations may not be effectively dispelled even though the
type of negligence required is some type implying voluntary
conduct. It would be better to phrase the test explicitly in
terms of recklessness in order to dispel connotations of
ordinary carelessness implicit in the use of the term "negligence."
(2) While a few courts, aided by statute, permit ordinary
negligence to suffice for criminal sanctions, the bulk of the
courts either expressly require recklessness before criminal
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liability attaches, or grope toward a standard of recklessness while talking in terms of negligence. As to recklessness, the better rule to apply is that requiring a strict test,
i.e., the defendant must (a) actually know the course of
conduct he is about to embark upon involves the probability
of death or great harm to another, and (b) choose to risk
occurrence of harm. This latter test comports favorably
with fundamental tenets of criminal law, i.e., that criminal
liability should attach only to voluntary harms. This limitation of criminal liability to voluntary harms would in turn
dispense with the term "involuntary manslaughter", except
where the legislature chose to retain such a term.
(3) Much of the confusion as to the proper test of recklessness stems from a failure to distinguish the subjective
test used to determine the defendant's state of mind from the
objective means of proving such state of mind. Objective
here means objective in the sense of externally observable
conduct which permits an inference as to the state of mind,
at the time of the act.

